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THE NUMBERS DILEMMA: THE CHIMERA OF MODERN POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 
JAMES F. GILSINAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the lexicon of dyadic American folk sayings, “motherhood and apple 
pie” is being joined by “transparency and accountability.” Similarly, like 
“motherhood and apple pie,” one takes on the iconic nature of the saying at 
considerable risk. After all, who could be against transparency and 
accountability? Management guru Stephen R. Covey argues that, 
“[a]ccountability breeds response-ability.”1 This formulation neatly captures 
the assumed relationship between accountability and performance. There is 
also an assumed relationship between transparency and a robust democratic 
system.2 Journalist Peter Finn notes, a “basic tenet of a healthy democracy is 
open dialogue and transparency.”3 Finally, accountability and transparency are 
seen as reinforcing each other.4 Being held accountable assumes that one’s 
actions are available for review and critique.5 Indeed, the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in the wake of the recent 
financial meltdown, attempts to regulate the disclosure requirements of 
financial firms on the assumption that such mandated transparency will result 
in better performance on the part of banks and other financial institutions.6 
Police departments in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to 
jump on the transparency and accountability bandwagon.7 The increasing use 
 
* E. Desmond Lee Professor in Collaborative Regional Education, Department of Public Policy 
Studies, Saint Louis University. 
 1. STEPHEN R. COVEY, PRINCIPLE-CENTERED LEADERSHIP 49 (1990). 
 2. Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the 
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999). 
 3. Peter Fenn, POLITICO: THE ARENA (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.politico.com/arena/ 
perm/Peter_Fenn_149A409A-FDA2-41EA-ACA1-41133DF86F66.html. 
 4. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 275, 282 
(2003). 
 5. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. R. 29, 29 (2005). 
 6. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 & What it Means for Joe & Jane 
Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 101 (2010). 
 7. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII:93 
of accessible, web-based, real time crime data, using geographic information 
system (GIS) technology to display neighborhood crime patterns, represents 
the move toward transparency on the part of major city police departments.8 
Similarly, the rapid adoption of COMPSTAT–like programs in mid to large 
size departments speaks to a willingness to be held accountable for crime 
occurrences and their control.9 Unfortunately, there are a multitude of reasons 
why systems designed to increase transparency and accountability will not 
work and, in fact, may make the very goals sought by programs of 
organizational reform less likely to be achieved. 
In this Article, I argue that there are five obstacles facing police reformers 
seeking to increase transparency and accountability in law enforcement 
organizations.10 Moreover, these obstacles are nearly insurmountable.11 The 
phrase “nearly insurmountable” means that while change can and will occur, 
the changes will, at best, be at the margins of the organization—and, at worst, 
such changes may make situations in need of correction more problematic.12 
This pessimistic assessment is due to the nature of the numbers themselves; the 
nature of organizations, particularly those that do not produce an objective 
product; the culture of policing; the institutional environment in which the 
police operate; and the larger cultures’ failure to distinguish among the 
concepts of data, information, and knowledge.13 
I.  THE SIREN SONG OF COUNTING AND NUMBERS 
When presented with a table of numbers that purport to objectively 
measure or describe a phenomenon, in keeping with the dictates of 
accountability or transparency, or both, the reader is often lulled into a state of 
process amnesia. Numbers are always the end product of a series of decisions, 
many of which are subjective and somewhat arbitrary.14 There are at least six 
decision points that affect the “objective” nature of the numbers being 
reported.15 The first is obviously the decision to count one thing rather than 
another.16 
 
 8. Id. at 1175. 
 9. John R. Firman, Deconstructing COMPSTAT to Clarify its Intent, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (2003). 
 10. See infra Parts I-V. 
 11. See Gary W. Sykes, The Functional Nature of Police Reform: The ‘Myth’ of Controlling 
the Police, 2 JUST. Q. 51, 53 (1985). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra note 37. 
 14. Craig D. Uchida, Carol Bridgeforth & Charles F. Wellford, Law Enforcement Statistics: 
The State of the Art, 5 AM. J. POLICE 23, 29 (1986). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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The simple act of deciding to count or not count something confers or 
denies a certain importance to an object or outcome. A number of criminal 
justice examples illustrate the point. 
Until the early 1970s, domestic assault did not “count” as a serious 
offense.17 On the other hand, homosexual activity between consenting adults 
did “count” as a crime.18 In fact, why do we bother to count crime at all? Those 
familiar with the history and the development of the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR) know the reason certain kinds of crime were counted was 
motivated by a political goal: shielding top police officials from the periodic 
crime crusades of the tabloid press.19 The sensationalism of crime reporting, 
and the consequent threat to the job stability of a police chief, literally could be 
count-ered by the “objectivity” of numbers.20 Of course, since its beginning, 
the UCR has been plagued by a second subjective decision point prior to 
arriving at a number: What counts as an instance of a phenomenon?21 
The specifically political nature of this decision point is noted by Deborah 
Stone who points out that counting requires classification, which in turn 
requires judgments about inclusion and exclusion—who or what is in or out.22 
Again, the history of the UCR nicely illustrates this dilemma. Crime categories 
have been known to expand or contract depending on the circumstances at 
hand.23 Thus, a municipality heavily dependent on tourism may employ very 
narrow definitions of what constitutes a criminal act, thereby keeping crime 
rates low. At budget time, a crime wave, based on expanding the category of 
what counts as a crime, may be helpful in obtaining additional resources. 
The third decision point that illustrates the subjective nature of a number is 
the choice of a procedure for counting to one.24 This may seem 
straightforward—one thing is one thing. But alas, one thing may be made up of 
multiple parts; thus, the question becomes whether to count the parts separately 
or as a unit. The UCR solves this dilemma by introducing a time dimension in 
 
 17. Faith E. Lutze & Megan L. Symons, The Evolution of Domestic Violence Policy 
Through Masculine Institutions: From Discipline to Protection to Collaborative Empowerment, 2 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 319, 322 (2003). 
 18. Bennett Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1279, 1281 
(1981). 
 19. Michael D. Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Historical Perspective, 23 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 32, 33 (1977). 
 20. Id. at 33–34. 
 21. Id. 
 22. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 146 
(3d ed. 2002). 
 23. Crime Reporting in the Age of Technology, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. (Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), 2000, at 12. 
 24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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deciding how to count to one.25 For example, if a car is vandalized as part of a 
series of auto vandalisms that all occurred within the same, designated time 
period, then that incident is counted as one occurrence of vandalism, even if 
twenty cars were involved.26 
The above example introduces the fourth challenge to numeric 
objectivity—the inability to understand what a number means unless the 
context in which the number was produced is also provided.27 Put another way, 
this is the siren song of numbers. Numbers appear to be objective and not 
tainted by context.28 Moreover, with too much contextual description, the 
elegant efficiency of numeric description is lost. This is a particular problem in 
attempting to use numbers either to provide transparency or to improve 
performance through accountability.29 There is a well-known aphorism that 
attests to the need for context: 
The Government are very keen on amassing statistics—they collect them, add 
them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful 
diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of those figures comes in 
the first instance from chowly dar (village watchman), who just puts down 
what he damn pleases.30 
This nineteenth century British warning continues to be of relevance in 
assessing modern, twenty-first century police intelligence units charged with 
analyzing data for the construction of actionable law enforcement 
interventions.31 In a recent study of British police intelligence analysis units, 
one analyst is quoted as saying, “the quota of information that we work on is as 
good as the officer puts on there. If you look at the standards of the [officers’] 
reports, they’re absolutely appalling. You know, and they’ve got the house 
number wrong, they’ve got the beat wrong.”32 The respondent goes on to note 
that these mistakes result in the identification of false hot spots—places of 
peak crime occurrences.33 The important point of this, however, is that the 
analysts make the best of the data they are given and report a de-contextualized 
version of an event (a series of numbers). As the authors note, those numbers 
fail to convey either the fluid nature of a criminal occurrence, and, thus, some 
 
 25. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING 
HANDBOOK 12 (2004). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Uchida, Bridgeforth & Wellford, supra note 14, at 25. 
 29. See Martin Innes et al., ‘The Appliance of Science?’ The Theory and Practice of Crime 
Intelligence Analysis, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 50–52 (2005). 
 30. JOSIAH STAMP, SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS OF MODERN LIFE 258–59 (1929). 
 31. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 50–52. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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of its underlying causes, or the interpretive work of the analyzer who fills in 
gaps in the data so that it becomes “sensical.”34 
The inability to convey context exacerbates a fifth characteristic of 
numbers, the objectification of evaluative criteria—i.e., disguising judgment as 
measurement.35 Deborah Stone gives a wonderful example of this process: 
“Paul Samuelson’s best-selling (economic) textbook declared in its 1970 
edition that full–employment was about 3.5 percent unemployment; by the 
time of its 1985 edition, the natural rate of unemployment had grown to around 
6 percent.”36 
Of course, today, the Obama administration would celebrate a 7 percent 
unemployment rate. The tendency of numbers to disguise a judgment as a 
measurement makes it difficult to hold the entities reporting the numbers 
accountable and to ensure organizational transparency.37 
Finally, as noted previously, the act of counting something confers a status 
on, or suggests the importance of, the thing counted.38 Therefore, both the 
counter and the counted react to the process of numbering.39 Organizationally, 
this refers to producing good numbers whether the entity is a police agency 
employing COMPSTAT or a school system participating in high stakes testing. 
The number becomes a goal in and of itself—separate from what the number 
represents. This unfortunately became the experience of the NYPD over the 
course of implementing COMPSTAT.40 In a study by John Eterno and Eli 
Silverman, field commanders quickly learned that they needed to look good 
(i.e. have good numbers) when presenting at COMPSTAT meetings if they 
wanted to avoid public humiliation.41 This resulted first in commanders 
spending inordinate amounts of time constructing data charts, rather than 
actually implementing the crime control strategies that the analysis might have 
suggested.42 Secondly, there was a strong temptation to manipulate the 
numbers.43 Thus, to truly understand what a number means, it is necessary to 
know about the organization that produces the number. It is to this issue that 
we now turn. 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 36. STONE, supra note 22, at 169. 
 37. Id. at 176–77. 
 38. Id. at 178. 
 39. Id. at 187. 
 40. See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City Police Department’s 
Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT’L J. OF POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 218, 219–26 (2006). 
 41. Id. at 223. 
 42. Id. at 228. 
 43. Id. at 227. 
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II.  ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE PROBLEM OF REFORM 
Daniel Kahneman, in a popular summary of current brain research, 
suggests that there are, at least metaphorically, two systems that control 
thinking.44 System one is intuitive, quick thinking, and bases conclusions on 
mental frames developed through past experience.45 These frames or beliefs 
are the templates used to explain the world as someone encounters it.46 System 
two is slower and engages in deliberative assessments of information.47 
However, system two responses require effort, and according to Kahneman, 
system two often lacks the requisite effort.48 Therefore, if system one presents 
an explanation that seems to make sense and accords with past experience, 
system two will accept the conclusions of system one without further analysis 
and critique.49 
This observation is parallel to an observation made by Herbert Simon 
about organizational decision-making.50 Decision-making in organizations 
does not involve analyzing all of the information available, but, instead, is 
represented by a process of “satisficing.”51 The decision-maker uses rules of 
thumb, that is, how this current situation is like a previous situation and what 
the appropriate response was in that previous situation.52 The use of analogous 
situations to make decisions mirror what has been discovered by brain 
research—neither as individuals nor as members of organizations do we 
optimize our decision-making, picking the best of all possible alternatives. 
Instead, we satisfice, picking the alternative that best seems to fit, without 
expending a great deal of energy to review—in a systematic way—all other 
possible choices.53 
Of course, this approach, both individually and organizationally, has some 
advantages.54 It conserves energy and allows for efficient decision-making.55 
In most cases, such decision-making processes or standard operating 
 
 44. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 105. 
 46. Id. at 21–22. 
 47. Id. at 49. 
 48. Id. at 31. 
 49. Id. at 24. 
 50. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER 
54 (2009). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 52. 
 53. Id. at 52–53. 
 54. See id. at 53. 
 55. Id. at 54. 
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procedures result in the individual or the organization moving forward to 
accomplish the task at hand.56 
The disadvantage of this course of action is that often individuals and 
organizations do not engage in an analytical process that would prevent major 
problems.57 Higher order analytical routines are most often employed after the 
fact—what went wrong and why?58 Post-mortems sometimes result in changed 
ways of behaving, but these soon become standard operating procedures and 
satisficing once again becomes the preferred mode of decision-making.59 
This suggests that changing the core activity of an organization and its 
routines of decision-making is very, very difficult.60 This may be particularly 
true in the public sector, where assessing performance is hindered by the lack 
of a concrete product or outcome.61 Performance criteria are instead influenced 
by political considerations, budgets, and the public mood.62 
In this kind of decision environment, it makes sense to ask whether any 
particular decision is based on technical or institutional criteria. A decision 
based on technical criteria responds to a change in the outside environment.63 
A new product or service is required to keep the organization competitive.64 
Therefore, structures are designed or redesigned to efficiently and effectively 
meet this demand.65 The organization that successfully navigates its 
environment’s technical demands is rewarded with more resources.66 Failure to 
do so jeopardizes resources.67 When an organization employs technical 
decision processes, it is engaging in a more sophisticated and analytical routine 
than simply satisficing.68 
A decision based on institutional criteria is much closer to the satisficing 
model or the system one brain model.69 The criteria for judging the success of 
 
 56. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER 
54 (2009). 
 57. See id. at 53; K. A. Archibald, Three Views of the Expert’s Role in Policymaking: 
Systems Analysis, Incrementalism, and the Clinical Approach, 1 POL’Y SCI. 73, 76, 82 (1970). 
 58. See Archibald, supra note 57, at 76. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 82. 
 61. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 114–15. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Sidney G. Winter, The Satisficing Principle in Capability Learning, 21 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J., 981, 982 (2000). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 983; James Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based 
Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 
150 (2007). 
 67. See Winter, supra note 63, at 982. 
 68. Id. at 983. 
 69. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151. 
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the organization involve neither efficiency nor effectiveness.70 The criteria 
instead involve judging the legitimacy of the organization based on cultural 
beliefs about how an organization should look and act.71 Perceived legitimacy 
rather than efficacy is what counts.72 Organizations operating in this kind of 
decision climate gain recognition and resources by: conforming to cultural 
beliefs and expectations about what it is they are supposed to do; and by 
becoming isomorphic with other institutions in their environment that have 
been rewarded for particular behaviors.73 
Research describing the adoption of COMPSTAT suggests that the 
adoption has been spurred primarily by institutional considerations.74 The rapid 
deployment of COMPSTAT mirrors an almost fadlike acceptance of the 
process rather than a careful and analytical investigation of how the process 
might adopt to a particular local situation or what pros and cons such adoption 
might entail.75 
Change spurred by the dynamic of institutional isomorphism is likely to be 
superficial.76 Core technologies and procedures are unlikely to be impacted.77 
This certainly seems to be the case with COMPSTAT.78 
In a study of three police departments that had adopted COMPSTAT, 
James Willis and his colleagues concluded that COMPSTAT simply raised 
reactive policing strategies to new levels. Police would respond quickly to a 
spike in crime, producing what the authors called a “whack-a-mole” effect.79 
Contrary to the assumptions of careful planning and the development of long 
term strategies, COMPSTAT simply encouraged business as usual, only even 
more so.80 Further, while commanders felt responsible for crime in their 
districts, there was very little communication to beat officers concerning 
COMPSTAT trends—with the result that officers’ daily routines were not 
impacted by the analysis derived from the gathered data.81 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Matthew J. Giblin, Structural Elaboration and Institutional Isomorphism: The Case of 
Crime Analysis Units, 29 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 643, 645 (2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Willis et al., supra note 66, at 161. 
 75. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 219. 
 76. Matthew J. Giblin & George W. Burruss, Developing a Measurement Model of 
Institutional Processes in Policing, 32 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 351, 
355 (2009). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Willis et al. supra note 66, at 152, 174–75. 
 79. Id. at 174. 
 80. Id. at 175. 
 81. Id. at 164–65. 
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Other studies have suggested that COMPSTAT also increased the gulf 
between the command culture and the street cop culture.82 For example, in 
New York, commanders took credit for dips in the crime rate, while passing 
blame to subordinates if the crime rate spiked in an area.83 
The concept of work culture is an important element in trying to 
understand why organizational change in general, and change toward more 
accountability and transparency, in particular, is difficult to achieve.84 In public 
sector agencies, the organizational dynamics just described, together with the 
cultural dynamics of such organizations, make the likelihood of fundamental 
change even more remote.85 We turn to the role of cultural dynamics next. 
III.  THE CULTURES OF MODERN DAY POLICING 
Our understanding of the cultural complexity of the modern police agency 
has come a long way from the studies of the 1970s, which concentrated 
primarily on the culture of the street officer.86 By the end of the decade, it was 
clear that police organizations had at least two distinct cultures: a street cop 
culture and a management culture.87 Today, it is recognized that there are 
multiple cultures within police agencies consisting not only of beat officers and 
higher ranked managers—but civilian cultures which span a fairly large 
professional hierarchy from clerical support staff, through 911 call-takers and 
dispatchers, to highly trained and credentialed personnel in such units as 
research and development, human resource management, and forensics.88 
Although not studied quite as intensively as the police subcultures, these 
other subcultures are beginning to receive more attention.89 In a study this 
Author conducted on police call-takers, it was evident their work culture was 
influenced by the stress and strains of being street level bureaucrats with too 
 
 82. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 222–23. 
 83. Id. at 224. 
 84. Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
339, 346 (1983). 
 85. Peter J. Robertson & Sonal J. Senevir, Outcomes of Planned Organizational Change in 
the Public Sector: A Meta-Analytic Comparison to the Private Sector, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547, 
548 (1995). 
 86. See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 57 (4th ed. 2011). 
 87. ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND 
MANAGEMENT COPS 1 (1983). 
 88. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New 
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209–10, 1229–30 
(2006). 
 89. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MEGAN A. ALDERDEN, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE, JOB 
SATISFACTION AMONG CIVILIANS IN POLICING 1 (2011), available at http://www.nationalpolice 
research.org/job-satisfaction-among-civilia/. 
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few resources to meet increasing demands.90 Many of the strategies they 
adopted were attempts to gain greater control over their work situation while 
still trying to meet the demands for service emanating from 911 calls.91 Chief 
among the strategies they employed was attempting to fit a caller’s demand 
into a pre-existing definition of a situation that permitted the dispatch of a 
car.92 Call-takers would often prompt callers as to how to appropriately frame 
their request.93 A key conclusion of this study was that police agencies do not 
respond directly to a situation, but instead respond to an organizationally 
projected frame that takes ambiguous information and forms it into an 
understandable pattern to which the agency can then respond in a routine 
fashion.94 
A similar conclusion was reached in a study conducted by this Author and 
a colleague focused on a police research and development (R&D) unit.95 The 
source of the ambiguous information for this unit was demands for data that 
would help other organizational units within the department make a decision 
about a problematic situation.96 Interestingly, the problem-solving sequence for 
the R&D unit did not start with an analysis of the problem they were supposed 
to research, but with an analysis of the political situation and the agenda of the 
person making the request.97 Once there was consensus on the real agenda and 
on a solution that would meet both political and practical realities, “research” 
was conducted to support this solution.98 Often, the research consisted of 
calling other police R&D units to see what they suggested in similar 
circumstances.99 This closed system of information processing allowed the 
organization to do what it would normally do anyway.100 “Research” simply 
reinforced standard operating procedures.101 
More recent research on police research units reinforces these initial 
observations.102 Martin Innes and his colleagues adopt the term “bricolage” to 
describe the tasks performed by crime analysts in two British police 
 
 90. See James F. Gilsinan, They is Clowning Tough: 911 and the Social Construction of 
Reality, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 332 (1989). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. at 332–33. 
 93. See id. at 340. 
 94. Id. at 341. 
 95. See generally James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, Bending Granite: Attempts to Change 
the Management Perspective of American Criminologists and Police Reformers, 15 J. POLICE 
SCI. & ADMIN. 196 (1987). 
 96. See id. at 197–98. 
 97. Id. at 198–99. 
 98. See id. at 199. 
 99. Id. at 197. 
 100. Id. at 202, 203. 
 101. James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, supra note 95, at 203. (1987). 
 102. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 54–55. 
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agencies.103 Crime analysts work with what they are given and take messy, 
contingent, and incomplete data to construct an objective, scientific product.104 
They put together the bric-a-brac of what they receive from field reports and 
construct a coherent pattern of events.105 The gaps in data are filled in by what 
everybody knows to be “true” about how criminals operate.106 The resulting 
product is a reproduction of the world that allows the department to enact its 
environment, i.e. project an image of a situation that allows for the carrying out 
of standard operating procedures.107 
While units that can contribute to transparency and accountability do not 
operate in ways that can easily achieve either characteristic, there are forces 
within the constellation of institutions of which any police agency is a part that 
encourages the particular organizational and cultural dynamics previously 
discussed.108 
IV.  THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
To paraphrase a piece of folk wisdom, no institution is an island. 
Institutions exist as part of a constellation of similar agencies.109 This 
institutional ecology creates a dynamic in which like organizations compete, 
cooperate, and engage in mutual adjustment.110 Similar organizations also 
provide a benchmark against which other organizations can be assessed.111 
A large body of research points to the different dynamics that exist in 
public sector constellations and private sector constellations.112 Organizational 
structures within the private sector respond to the technical demands of their 
environments.113 Structures are adopted, modified, or abandoned based on the 
need for efficiency and effectiveness—and are traits measured in terms of 
profitability.114 This metric can be used to assess one organization’s standing 
vis-à-vis other similar organizations.115 If a competitor is doing better, there is 
 
 103. Id. at 50. 
 104. Id. at 51. 
 105. See id. at 42, 47–48. 
 106. See id. at 43, 53. 
 107. Id. at 54. 
 108. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 40, 49–50. 
 109. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 
147, 152 (1983). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES xi–xii (1980); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized 
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977); Willis 
et al., supra note 66, at 147. 
 113. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 150. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 152. 
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an effort to find out why and to perhaps change the organizational structure to 
match the structure of the more successful entity.116 
The dynamic in the public sector is fueled less by demonstrating 
organizational effectiveness and more by demonstrating organizational 
legitimacy.117 Public sector organizations operate in environments that have no 
clear technology for achieving results, no clear metrics for measuring success, 
and no clear link between an action and an outcome.118 Marshall Meyer and 
Lynne Zucker define such organizations as permanently failing.119 They 
survive despite an inability to demonstrate technical efficiency by substituting 
demonstrations of conformity with culture demands and beliefs.120 They 
operate in accordance with how the culture says an organization of this type 
should operate.121 
As noted above, the two models of organizational response have been 
termed the technical model and the institutional model.122 In studies of police 
agencies, the institutional model is ascendant.123 Again, this suggests strong 
pressures on individual police agencies to become isomorphic with their 
institutional environments.124 
There are three sources of pressure toward isomorphism.125 When 
organizations change in response to funding opportunities, or in response to 
more powerful organizations—for example legislative committees—they are 
experiencing coercive isomorphism.126 If the change is in response to licensure 
requirements or accreditation criteria, there is normative pressure to 
conform.127 Finally, if the organization itself seeks to mimic a successful 
organization in the same institutional constellation, the conformity is described 
as mimetic.128 
All three conformity pressures are nicely illustrated in the recent history of 
police agencies in the United States.129 In 1968, the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration was formed as part of the Johnson administration’s 
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war on crime.130 LEAA provided funding for a variety of innovations in law 
enforcement from the adoption of night scopes and helicopters, to college 
tuition for police officers.131 Much of the funding was apparently used to 
purchase equipment of questionable value for the day-to-day tasks of civilian 
law enforcement.132 But, for a time, armored personnel carriers, night scopes, 
and helicopters were popular among urban police departments.133 
Currently, many police agencies are demonstrating their legitimacy by 
obtaining accreditation from The Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), “the gold standard in public safety.”134 
Accreditation agencies spur normative conformity since the set of standards for 
such recognition are standardized for the whole of the profession.135 CALEA 
claims it is the gold standard among public safety accrediting bodies because 
“[t]he primary cornerstones that comprise the CALEA Difference and 
distinguish CALEA from all other forms of public safety accreditation are 
professionalism, stewardship, integrity, diversity, independence, continuous 
improvement, objectivity, credibility, consistency, knowledge, experience, 
accountability and collaboration.”136 
One is immediately struck by the lofty ambitions of the cornerstones and 
the difficulty of measuring them. One suspects that the definitions of the terms 
are operationalized on the ground through the application of tacit knowledge, 
i.e. the phrase “I don’t know exactly what professionalism is, but I know it 
when I see it.” 
As noted previously, research on COMPSTAT suggests a mimetic 
adoption.137 For example, Willis, et. al., in their study of COMPSTAT, 
describe departments seeking to incorporate the strategy within their own 
agencies after simply visiting New York, observing how it operated, and 
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bringing it back to their own jurisdictions.138 There was no technical process of 
adopting the strategy to local conditions, nor even a clear reason why it should 
be adopted given the unique circumstances of the jurisdiction.139 It would be 
hard to imagine a more idoneous example of mimetic adoption. 
V.  DATA, INFORMATION, AND KNOWLEDGE 
In the philosophy of science, it is common to distinguish among the terms 
data, information, and knowledge.140 Although the terms are often used 
interchangeably,141 it is useful to distinguish them analytically to understand 
both the problems and the prospects of achieving transparency and 
accountability through the use of “better” intelligence. 
Data are simply observations about phenomena.142 Information is data that 
will make a difference.143 Knowledge is information that provides guidance for 
action by describing relationships between means and ends.144 The differences 
among these terms can be illustrated by the example of student test scores.145 
The scores themselves are data.146 Arrayed to show that minority students do 
worse than nonminority students, the data becomes information, particularly to 
those interested in minority achievement.147 Were further analyses to suggest 
what factors influence such achievement, and how a manager might 
manipulate these factors, the information would achieve the status of 
knowledge.148 
As the reviews of various strategies for achieving transparency and 
accountability suggest, much of what goes into the databases used for 
achieving these ends remain simply data.149 Only occasionally is it processed 
in a way to produce information.150 And rarely, indeed, is it raised to the level 
of knowledge.151 
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Melvin Dubnick provides a useful list of the things accountability centered 
reforms are thought to achieve.152 Accountability will enhance transparency 
and, thus, strengthen democratic institutions (“the promise of democracy”).153 
Abuses of authority will become apparent and correctable (“the promise of 
justice”).154 Accountability will provide oversight of public officials promoting 
appropriate behavior (“the promise of ethical behavior”).155 Improved 
government service will result from accountability structures (“the promise of 
performance”).156 Concentrating on the last of these, Dubnick convincingly 
demonstrates that the supposed link between accountability and performance is 
anything but certain.157 
Linking accountability to the concept of account giving, Dubnick 
demonstrates how account giving is contingent on the nature of, the reasons 
for, the mode of, and the places where accounts are provided.158 In other 
words, there is a performative nature to account giving itself, which makes its 
relationship to actually influencing performance, in a technical sense, 
problematic.159 People gather data for all sorts of reasons and give accounts to 
achieve a variety of ends. As has been demonstrated throughout this Article, 
data is molded into information that serves the immediate purposes of the 
account giver, and these can be far removed from the original purposes for 
gathering the data in the first place.160 
The contingent nature of accounts and account giving suggests why 
information seldom becomes knowledge.161 Instead, data and information 
bounce back and forth between each other, as data is applied to and reported by 
a variety of account givers and audiences.162 
There is a similar intervening mechanism when one considers the 
dynamics of transparency. Like accountability, transparency is thought to be 
the holy grail of reform.163 More information can clean up campaign financing, 
make consumers safer, and protect homebuyers from unscrupulous lenders.164 
Why this in fact does not occur, as the last example clearly illustrates, is that 
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transparency is thought to be achieved through the mechanism of disclosure.165 
But disclosure is often in the form of data and information, thus lacking the 
context necessary to be able to reasonably act on it.166 Anybody who has 
bought a house understands that all of the disclosures produced on forms that 
the home buyer is required to sign is data that no one has time to read. It fails 
to even rise to the level of information. Similarly, detailed labels and 
pamphlets accompanying many pharmaceuticals give a great deal of 
information on potentially harmful side effects and negative drug interactions, 
but, again, the detailed disclosure is often overwhelming, so it is left unread. 
Hence, the irony—the higher the level of disclosure—the potentially lower 
level of transparency. 
As Elisabeth Rosenthal notes in her New York Times opinion piece, we 
now live in a culture of disclosure where disclosure becomes an end in itself 
rather than a means to an end.167 The result is less transparency as data dumps 
become ways of obfuscating rather than enlightening.168 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The above analysis suggests at least three lessons concerning the quest for 
greater transparency and accountability. Lesson one is there is no such thing as 
immaculate perception, despite the allure of numbers suggesting otherwise.169 
Numbers are always the end result of a process that requires a series of 
judgments. These judgments are filtered through organizational, cultural, and 
institutional environments which determine what gets counted and how. 
Second, all attempts at transparency and accountability are mediated 
through social performance mechanisms which alter the direct link between 
data, information, and the technical process of applying the intelligence in 
ways that achieve the desired ends.170 In the case of accountability, the 
dynamics of account giving results in performative acts that may have little to 
do with propelling organizational change—instead what is propelled is the 
agenda of the account giver.171 The objective of that agenda is often to show 
“good” numbers to enhance or protect one’s standing in the organization.172 
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This has certainly been the case with the implementation of COMPSTAT.173 
Similarly, in the case of transparency, the mechanism of disclosure creates a 
dynamic where disclosure becomes an end in itself.174 Thus, in many instances 
data is provided, but not information or knowledge that can be acted on. Data 
dumps then become a way of avoiding transparency.175 
Finally, like brains, organizations appear to have two systems of 
processing information.176 The dominant system depends on standard operating 
procedures for assessing information and problem-solving.177 The key 
mechanism of this system appears to be the use of analogy, i.e. how is this new 
situation like one we have encountered before and what did we do then.178 This 
satisficing approach is efficient, but not geared to either critical analysis or 
fundamental organizational change.179 The critical thinking system of an 
organization is seldom activated before the fact.180 Only when things have 
gone terribly wrong does this system kick in to ask, “what happened and how 
can this be avoided in the future?”181 Interestingly, the quest for accountability 
and transparency has often been a product of this kind of analysis.182 
Unfortunately, as this Article has demonstrated, once systems of accountability 
and transparency become part of the standard operating procedure of an 
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